



Conventionalism is a viewpoint, most closely associated with the
later writings of Wittgenstein, that emphasizes practice and context.' It
holds, for example, that we understand a concept not when we grasp
some fact, but when we can successfully use that concept within a lan-
guage game or a defined context, and that truth is a function of the
agreement of those participating within a practice rather than the other
way around. There's nothing "out there," and even if there were, we
couldn't possibly know it. Stanley Fish has developed a general theory
of interpretation that also emphasizes practice and context and accord-
ingly might be seen as a branch of conventionalism. His concern was
first with literary texts; he is a Milton scholar and, with the publication
in 1980 of Is There a Text in This Class?, also established his preemi-
nence as a literary theorist. In a number of recent articles,2 however, he
moved on to legal texts, and in one sought to criticize an account that I
gave of constitutional interpretation.
3
In the spirit of conventionalism, Fish reminds us that both the
judge and the Constitution are always contextualized-the judge is a
* Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law, Yale University. I am especially grateful
for the research and editorial assistance of Lynn Baker.
1. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe trans. 1953).
See also S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982). Conventionalism
is a term more commonly used in the philosophy of science for the view that scientific laws are not
imposed by nature, but rather are conventions we chose from among the various ways of describ-
ing the world. The origin of conventionalism is usually traced to Henri Poincaire, H. POINCAiRE
SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS (W. Greenstreet trans. 1905), although it is probably better known
today through the work of Thomas Kuhn, T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS (2d ed. 1970).
2. E.g., Fish, Interpretation andthe Pluralist Vision, 60 TEx. L. REv. 495 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Fish, Pluralist Vision]; Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Litera-
ture, 60 TEx. L. REv. 551 (1982).
3. Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1984) (a response to Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982)).
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thoroughly socialized member of a profession and the Constitution is
never "waiting around for interpretation" but is "always an already
interpreted object." 4 This claim about the contextualized nature of text
and reader seems to me to be entirely correct, and I gladly embrace it,
but I do not believe it leads to or in any way supports Fish's theory of
constitutional interpretation. One branch of his theory pictures the
judge knowing immediately and without reflection what to do, simply
by virtue of being a socialized member of the profession; the other de-
nies that the Constitution embodies a public morality or, for that mat-
ter, anything else.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF OUR DISAGREEMENT
It is easy to overstate my disagreement with Fish and his theory of
interpretation. To avoid this error, I think it best to step back and be-
gin by locating this disagreement within the recent debates in the pro-
fession over theories of interpretation. Interpretation has always been
a favorite topic for legal academics, but for the most part it has been
confined to private law issues, such as wills and contracts. Within the
last several years, however, it has moved to the great public law ques-
tions of the day and has engaged the attention of constitutional
theorists.
A. No FREEDOM
One group of theorists renders the concept of interpretation in a
most deterministic fashion. An example is John Ely, who depicts inter-
pretation as an intellectual process in which outcomes or decisions are
determined by the specific words contained in the text (a process he
sometimes terms "clause-bound interpretivism").5 Interpretation, for
Ely, is confined to the highly specific clauses of the Constitution, such
as the one requiring the President to be at least 35 years old;6 it cannot
be used to characterize judgments under more general provisions such
as the equal protection clause.
In his recent book, Michael Perry displays a similar attitude to-
ward interpretation but broadens its application.7 He too allows the
4. Id
5. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1-41 (1980).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
7. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). In this
Symposium, Perry abandons that position and appears to adopt a view of interpretation that is less
deterministic and, I think, more acceptable. He calls it "nonoriginalist interpretation." I admire
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interpreter virtually no freedom, but, in contrast to Ely, admits that it
might be possible to speak of interpreting more general constitutional
provisions. All that would be needed is a method of constraining the
reader. Perry finds the source of constraint in a highly specific concep-
tion of authorial intent and, in the context of the general clauses, sees
interpretation as a species of originalism.8 Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion9 could be understood as an interpretation of the equal protection
clause, Perry argues, only if the framers had intended to prohibit segre-
gated schools and Brown was but an implementation of that wish.'0
On the topic of originalism, Ronald Dworkin has said that the is-
sue in constitutional interpretation is not whether to consider authorial
intent, but what should count as intent." Dworkin sees two levels of
intent-one denoted a "concept" (an abstract value) and the other a
"conception" (a concrete application of that value)--and he argues in
favor of the more abstract. 2 He insists that the relevant inquiry in
Brown is not whether the framers intended to prohibit segregated
schools (the conception), but whether they intended to embody a value
such as equality (the concept), which, in turn, could be understood by
future generations to outlaw segregated schools. Perry, drawing on
Munzer and Nickel,' 3 dismisses Dworkin's argument by saying that
there is no empirical evidence that the framers had an abstract rather
than a concrete intention (or that they wanted their abstract intention
to govern). 4 But Dworkin in fact provided the best evidence imagina-
ble-the language of the clause itself.'5 The framers had a choice be-
tween specific and abstract language, and their choice of the latter is,
for Dworkin, a fairly good indication of what level of intent they
thought should govern. Dworkin also claimed that the empirical evi-
dence Perry sought was irrelevant because the choice of what kind of
intent should govern (abstract rather than specific) should not itself
Professor Perry's openmindedness but continue to address his earlier views because they have
achieved a certain currency and represent one important strain in the professional debates.
Perry's book presents a theory of interpretation not unlike that advanced by Raoul Berger. SeeR.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
8. The term "originalism" was first coined by Paul Brest. Brest, The Misconceived Questfor
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 66-75.
11. Dworkin, The Forum of Princoile, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 499-500 (1981).
12. Id. at 476-82, 488-98.
13. Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meanti 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 1029, 1037-41 (1977).
14. M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 70 & n.71.
15. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 494-95.
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turn on what the framers intended on that issue (for that would involve
a circularity) but rather on a political theory (unfortunately not yet
worked out by Dworkin). 6 To this, Perry made no rejoinder: He
seemed determined, in his effort to explicate the concept of interpreta-
tion, to reduce authorial intent to a more specific level. t7
In this determination, Perry reflects the same impulse as Ely and,
earlier, Thomas Grey'4-seeing interpretation as a largely mechanical
process which denies a creative role for the reader. Ely reduces inter-
pretation to textual determinism, while Perry, addressing the more gen-
eral clauses, sees it as a form of originalism. For Ely, the judge
interpreting the Constitution is carrying out the specific directives of
the Constitution. To use the familiar metaphor, the judge is the phono-
graph, the words on the parchment are the record. For Perry, authorial
intent is the record. A judge engaged in interpreting a clause such as
equal protection is implementing original intent; to minimize the crea-
tive role of the judge, Perry formulates that intent to make it a wholly
sufficient basis for resolving the case before the court-very specific
and concrete. Perry in fact speaks of the framers' intent in terms of
"value judgments," and of the Constitution as an embodiment of those
judgments.' 9 He appears to conceive of the framers as judges (rather
than political actors), distinguished from the Justices of the Supreme
Court only by their multitude (hundreds of thousands, rather than
nine) and their age (they formulated their judgments in 1868 rather
than 1954).
I take issue with the Ely-Perry conception of interpretation be-
cause it is excessively mechanistic. As I argued in my earlier article,
such a conception confuses interpretation with execution. For me an
interpretation is determined neither by the specific words on the parch-
ment nor by an assessment of the specific concrete intentions of the
framers, although each plays a role. Interpretation is not reducible to
either textual determinism or originalism but, instead, contemplates a
dynamic interaction between text and reader in which an analysis of
the text's specific words and of the concrete intent of the framers is only
part of the process by which that meaning is understood. I do not take
issue with the substantive views of either Ely or Perry, inasmuch as
16. Id at 493-98.
17. M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 70-71.
18. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). Like
Perry, Grey has begun to retreat from his early deterministic account of interpretation. See Grey,
The Constitution as Scrioture, 37 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1985).
19. M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 10-11, 74-75.
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each envisions a role for the Supreme Court that extends beyond what
he calls "interpretation." For Ely, Brown is an instance of "ultimate
interpretivism"' 0 (which he distinguishes from ordinary interpretation
or "clause-bound interpretivism" and which is in truth not a form of
interpretation but a program for using the judicial power to perfect
majoritarian processes). For Perry, Brown is an instance of "constitu-
tional policy-making" under which the judge "reaches decision without
really interpreting any provision of the constitutional text"'' and in-
stead writes into law his or her "own values (albeit, values ideally ar-
rived at through, and tested in the crucible of, a very deliberate search
for right answers)."22 Given Ely's and Perry's positions on a case like
Brown, so central to the modem understanding of the judicial power, it
might seem that my disagreement with them over interpretation is only
nominal; we all accept Brown as a legitimate exercise of the judicial
power but use different words to describe the same intellectual activity.
It seems important, however, to recover the concept of interpreta-
tion and to avoid the mechanistic view of that activity. It seems impor-
tant to understand that interpretation permits the judge or reader a
creative role and that a decision such as Brown could be seen as an
interpretation of the Constitution. Such an understanding would forge
links between law and literature and bring into our vision the work of
literary theorists like Stanley Fish. It would remove some of the con-
troversy and puzzlement surrounding the Supreme Court's role in our
political system, for it allows us to conceive of the Court's function in
the most elemental and widely accepted terms. Such an understanding
would also emphasize the unity of constitutional adjudication, whether
the Court is applying the first amendment, the equal protection clause,
or the clause specifying the minimum age of the President. There may
be more disagreement over the meaning of one clause than another, but
the function of the Court and the methods by which it discharges that
function are the same and do not vary from clause to clause.
Ely and, to a large extent, Perry identify the countermajoritarian
dilemma as their preeminent concern,23 and I will concede that recov-
ering the idea of interpretation and characterizing a decision such as
20. J. ELY, supra note 5, at 88.
21. M. PERRY, supranote 7, at 11.
22. Id. at 123. Perry seizes upon Raoul Berger's research into the framers' intent on school
segregation with a relish that makes one suspect that he is not trying to find a proper basis for
Brown but is instead trying to use Brown as a way of legitimating this more controversial theory of
judicial review. Id. at 66-75. See also Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 686 (1978).
23. J. ELY, supra note 5, at 1-9; M. PERRY, supra note 7, at 1-8.
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Brown as an instance of interpretation will not solve that dilemma. In-
terpretation is countermajoritarian, even if properly understood. On
the other hand, a proper conception of interpretation will help us un-
derstand the pervasiveness of the countermajoritarian dilemma and
thus, in my judgment, reduce its significance. The highly mechanical
kind of activity that Ely and Perry characterize as interpretation is
widely accepted, and yet it puts the majority at risk. True, the role of
the judge is trivialized under that conception of interpretation (the
judge is the phonograph), but power is not transferred from the judge
to the contemporary majority. It is instead given to the framers, as
manifest in either the words scribbled in 1787 or 1868 or their concrete
intentions. And the countermajoritarian dilemma, as formulated and
propounded by Bickel 4 and addressed by Perry and Ely, focuses on
the tensions between the Supreme Court and the current majority (as
reflected in the practices of the elected representatives).
B. TOTAL FREEDOM
Standing at the other end of the spectrum is a theorist such as San-
ford Levinson. 5 He repudiates the Ely-Perry conception of interpreta-
tion as excessively mechanical and, in an effort to bridge the gap
between law and literature, emphasizes the creative role of the judge.
But Levinson errs in the other direction: His conception of interpreta-
tion is too dynamic. While the Ely-Perry conception denies any free-
dom to the interpreter or reader, Levinson's exalts that freedom-too
much for my taste.
Levinson is prepared to treat Brown as an interpretation of the
equal protection clause (without regard to the framers' intent) only be-
cause he believes all interpretation is a constructive process. Levinson
begins his account with the observation that the Constitution is capable
of any number of readings and then characterizes the judicial task as
one of choosing among these different readings. He also asserts that
the judge is (relatively) free to choose among these readings and that
there are no standards-distinctively legal standards-by which to
evaluate that choice. Levinson, like Ely, Perry, and myself and pre-
sumably Fish (and maybe the entire generation of which we are part),
believes Brown is a correct decision. But for Levinson the "correct-
ness" of Brown derives simply from the fact that he shares the political
24. A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962).
25. See Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373 (1982).
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or moral (but not legal) vision that guided the Justices' choice among
the many possible readings of the equal protection clause.
Just as I reject the Ely-Perry account of interpretation as too deter-
ministic, I reject Levinson's account as too free. I start with the view
that the Constitution embodies a public morality, including a commit-
ment to racial equality. But I recognize that this commitment, when
applied to a particular situation, such as segregated schools, is capable
of several readings, some of which may conflict with other constitu-
tional promises, such as liberty. The judicial task is to choose among
these readings (and to harmonize the whole), and this choice is for me,
as it was for Levinson, the core of the intellectual process known as
interpretation (legal or literary). Unlike Levinson, however, I do not
believe that the choice is unconstrained.
The judge's choice is constrained by a set of rules (or norms, stan-
dards, principles, guides, etc.)26 that are authorized by the professional
community of which the judge is part (and that define and constitute
the community). A judge might be directed, for example, to pay partic-
ular attention to the wording of a text and to the intent of the framers,
while a political actor might consider the impact of segregation on the
conduct of foreign affairs. Adherence to the rules authorized by the
professional community imparts a measure of impersonality to a legal
judgment (its objective quality) and at the same time provides the stan-
dards for evaluating the correctness of the judgment as a legal judg-
ment. I can say Brown is a correct interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment because it conforms to the properly authorized disciplining
rules, not because I subscribe to some political or moral tenet that con-
demns racial segregation.
II. THE STRUGGLE OVER THE MIDDLE GROUND: THE
SOURCES OF CONSTRAINT
Stanley Fish and I are united in our effort to secure the middle
ground. I believe he would reject the Ely-Perry conception of interpre-
tation as excessively mechanical, and I know (from another article27 )
that he rejects Levinson's proclamation of freedom. Fish believes, as I
do, that the interpretive process-whether it be of a specific clause or a
highly general one, like equal protection-is neither wholly determined
26. The term "rules" is used by me interchangeably with "norms," "standards," and "princi-
ples," and is meant to suggest, as Fish understands, a generalized assertion about what should be
done.
27. Fish, Pluralist Vision, supra note 2.
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nor wholly free, but is constrained. What we are divided over is the
nature of the constraints and the account we give of them: Fish empha-
sizes practice and I emphasize norms. Compared to my disagreement
with those at the ends of the spectrum-Ely and Perry at one, Levinson
at the other-this difference might seem trivial (and probably accounts
for the play on the similarity of our names in Fish's title and the diffi-
culty some may have in remembering who's who). But I believe the
difference between us is worth noting: Fish's account of these con-
straints trivializes the reflective moments of the law and, like Levin-
son's account (but for different reasons), blurs the distinction between
law and politics.
In countering Levinson, I thought it necessary to introduce two
concepts: one is the idea of disciplining rules, which constrain the
judge, and the other is that of an interpretive community, which is de-
fined and constituted by, and confers authority upon, the disciplining
rules. Fish has claimed a proprietary interest in the idea of an interpre-
tive community and thus, not surprisingly, his criticism is addressed
only to my notion of disciplining rules (although we use the concept of
an interpretive community differently-I see it as a source of authority
for the disciplining rules, and Fish sees it as the source of shared under-
standings). Fish makes two claims about the disciplining rules: first,
they will not work, and second, they are unnecessary.
A. THE USEFULNESS OF DISCIPLINING RULES
Disciplining rules are, as I have said, to provide constraints. "Un-
fortunately," Fish comments, "rules are texts; they therefore are in
need of interpretation and cannot serve as a constraint on interpreta-
tion." 8 I agree that disciplining rules must be interpreted and like Fish
conceive of the interpretive process as a dynamic interaction between
the text and the reader; but none of this renders these rules incapable of
constraining the interpretive process.
To see this, let us return to Brown. The Justices' task was to deter-
mine whether segregated schools were consistent with the promise of
equality in the fourteenth amendment. This seems like a rather open-
ended judgment, one in which the Justices could have said a large
number of things or, as Levinson (invoking a notable image of Richard
Rorty) might put it, they could have beaten the text into any shape that
28. Fish, supra note 3.
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served their purposes.29 I maintain, however, that their freedom was in
fact bounded by certain disciplining rules, some that required them to
pay attention to precedents, others that directed their attention to the
purposes of the Civil War and the fourteenth amendment, and still
others that precluded them from favoring one side over the other sim-
ply because of the race of the parties. Under my view of interpretation,
judges faced with an open-ended question (such as whether Jim Crow
laws are consistent with equal protection) are increasingly circum-
scribed in their discretion by more particularized constraints (which di-
rect their attention to the framers' intent, precedent, etc.). The image I
have in mind is that of a judge moving toward judgment along a spiral
of norms that increasingly constrain.
At any point in the spiral there might be a disagreement over the
meaning of a rule (just as there might be disagreement over whether
the conditions that make the rule applicable are present). There may,
for example, be a dispute as to the level of authorial intent one must
look to-whether it be the particularized desires of the framers with
regard to segregated schools or, as Dworkin would maintain, their gen-
eral concept of equality. To resolve this dispute, the disciplining rules
must be interpreted, and the process of interpreting those rules must
itself be constrained by other norms further along or higher up the spi-
ral. Of course, if the dispute about any norm is so pervasive as to re-
turn one to the previous level of constraint, then we have made no
progress. The judge is as unconstrained as before we made any men-
tion of disciplining rules.
In my original article I acknowledged the possibility of disputes
over a disciplining rule, but then confidently asserted, "The authority
of a particular rule can be maintained even when it is disputed. . .. "10
To this Fish replies, "But how can 'it' be maintained as a constraint
when the dispute is about what 'it' is or about what 'it' means?" 3' I
would answer: the same way that the Constitution, or a statute, or a
common law rule can be "maintained" as a constraint even though
there are disputes as to its meaning. Disputes over the meaning of a
text deny neither the existence of the text nor that it has a meaning
which can inform, guide or constrain intellectual processes.
29. Levinson, supra note 25, at 385 (quoting R. RORTY, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and
Twentieth-Century Textualism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 151 (1982)).
30. Fiss, supra note 3, at 747.
31. Fish, supra note 3.
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Some may insist that my account of constraint collapses because
the disputes about the meaning or the application of the disciplining
rules (such as the one about framers' intent) are more pervasive than I
was originally willing to allow, so that there is no way to reduce the
vast freedom Levinson claims for the judge. Maybe the judge has no
guidance besides the spacious words of the equal protection clause. I
don't think so, but this is not the place to explore this problem because
it is not Fish's point. He insists that disciplining rules cannot constrain
even "where there is perfect agreement about what the rule is and what
it means."3
In insisting that the disciplining rules will not work, Fish is not
making a claim about the pervasiveness of disagreement or of disputes
about the meaning of disciplining rules. He is not making a claim
about indeterminacy but about contextualization. He notes that disci-
plining rules, like any text, are always situated within a practice and
thus are always interpreted, even where there is perfect agreement as to
what they mean. And from this rather straightforward observation
Fish concludes that these rules cannot constrain: "[A] so-called 'disci-
plining rule' cannot be said to act as a constraint on interpretation be-
cause it is (in whatever form has been specified for it) the product of
one."
33
I am a conventionalist insofar as I see all texts and agents as situ-
ated. 4 I agree with Fish that all disciplining rules, even where there is
no dispute as to their meaning, are in need of interpretation and have
in fact received that interpretation. Like all texts, disciplining rules are
always contextualized and arrive in an "interpreted shape. '35 But that
does not reduce (in either a logical or practical sense) the content or
meaning of a rule to its various interpretations,3 6 nor does it mean that
one text (disciplining rules) cannot constrain the interpretation of an-
other text (the Constitution).
B. THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINING RULES
Fish's intent, recall, is not simply to deny that disciplining rules
will provide constraint, but also to show that they are unnecessary:
The freedom of which Levinson spoke, and that I offered my disciplin-
32. Id
33. Id.
34. See K. Christman, Law as a Rational Enterprise 12 (1984) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
35. Fish, supra note 3.
36. Wittgenstein himself wrote, "any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it
interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine mean-
ing." L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 198, at 80e.HeinOnline -- 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 186 1985
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ing rules to combat, does not exist. In denying this freedom, Fish does
not revert to the mechanistic conception of interpretation offered by
Ely or Perry, nor does he confine himself to the so-called specific
clauses. Rather he tries, once again, to use the conventionalist empha-
sis on practice and context to give a new and different account of the
middle ground.
1. The Contextualization of the Reader
One part of Fish's account relates to the position of the interpreter
or judge. I picture the judge trying to choose, in a self-conscious and
reflective manner, between the arguments of the contending lawyers,
and in that process thinking about and perhaps discussing (with col-
leagues and clerks) the rules or norms of the profession-What do they
imply for the case at hand? Are they in conflict? Fish pictures the
judge as an actor who is thoroughly socialized into the profession (or
practice) and who, by virtue of that socialization (and perhaps the life
processes that make the judge the person that he or she is), knows "not
upon reflection, but immediately" 37 what to do. For Fish, the judge is
like a basketball player who plays the game beautifully and instinc-
tively, without, so Fish says, reflecting on the rules of the game in any
way.38
Fish introduces this peculiar picture of the judge in the course of
his attack on the disciplining rules, for they are the professional norms
and symbolize a kind of reflective or abstract knowledge or "knowl-
edge that" (as opposed to "knowledge how").3 9 Fish first makes a point
about the method by which students are initiated into the legal
profession:
The student studies not rules but cases, pieces of practice, and what
he or she acquires are not abstractions, but something like "know
how" or "the ropes," the ability to identify (not upon reflection, but
37. Fish, supra note 3.
38. Lest you think I am unfair in attributing to Fish this picture of the judge as basketball
player, let me quote the critical passage:
[The judge] is already filled with and constituted by the very meanings that on Fiss's
account he is dangerously free to ignore. This amounts finally to no more, or less, than
saying that the agent is always and already situated, and that to be situated is not to be
looking about for constraints or happily evading them (in the mode, supposedly, of nihil-
ism) but to be constrained already. To be a judge or a basketball player is not to be able
to consult the rules (or, alternatively, to disregard them) but to have become an extension
of the "know how" that gives the rules (if there happen to be any) the meaning they will
immediately and obviously have.
Id.
39. The distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that" is presented in greater de-
tail in G. RYLE, THE CONCEr OF MIND (1949).
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immediately) a crucial issue, to ask a relevant question, to propose an
appropriate answer from a range of appropriate answers, etc.
40
In truth, the student learns both cases ("pieces of practice") and rules,
and for the remainder of his or her professional life will use both. Fish
acknowledges this (as he puts it, "Somewhere along the way 'the young
initiate' will also begin to formulate rules."41), but then he takes a
wrong turn. Rather than acknowledging the interactive nature of rules
and practice-the rules will shape the practice just as the practice will
shape the rules-he tries to establish a theoretical (as opposed to just a
temporal) priority for practice.
Fish's argument for this priority rests on but a single assertion.
The student, lawyer, or judge, Fish insists, "will be able to produce and
understand [the rules] only because he is deeply inside, indeed, is a part
of, the context in which they become intelligible. ' 42 I may agree with
Fish that only lawyers can "understand" and "produce" the profes-
sional norms (though he may be a glaring exception) and thus, with a
nod toward conventionalism, I once again acknowledge the importance
of practice. But Fish's point establishes neither the priority of practice
nor the secondary nature of the rules (or "knowledge that"), for a recip-
rocal claim can be made on behalf of rules: A person could not con-
tinue to operate successfully within the practice and be considered a
good lawyer or judge without understanding and being able to articu-
late and critically evaluate the rules or norms that govern the practice.
While it is true that one cannot fully understand the rules of grammar
(or, to revert to Fish's favorite example, basketball) unless one also
speaks and uses the language (or plays the game), one cannot fully par-
ticipate in a practice, much less occupy an exalted place within a prac-
tice (especially the practice of law) without knowing the rules and
being able to talk about them in an abstract or reflective manner. Prac-
tice informs the rules and the rules inform the practice.
Admittedly, the judge does not consult a Judge's Rule Book on a
day-to-day basis in order to determine what factors to consider in
40. Fish, supra note 3.
41. Id
42. Id (emphasis added). Elsewhere he puts the point a little more provocatively. He de-
scribes the President appointing to the bench someone who has no previous judicial and legal
experience, and who, on his appointment, is handed a rule book:
What would happen? The new judge would soon find that she was unable to read the
rules without already having a working knowledge of the practices they were supposed
to order, or, to put it somewhat more paradoxically, she would find that she could read
the rules that are supposed to tell her what to do only when she already knew what to do.
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reaching judgment, or otherwise to guide him to judgment, any more
than the native speaker consults a grammar book before each utter-
ance. Rules, norms, principles, standards, or other general normative
propositions can be internalized; a large part of the educational process
of any profession is aimed at the internalization of its norms. And
sometimes the norms are so thoroughly internalized that a judge can
decide without reflecting upon them or considering them in any con-
scious manner. Judges now and then decide almost by instinct; the
press of their work may sometimes force them to. But this is not always
the case and, in any event, in introducing the concept of disciplining
rules my intent was not to provide an empirical report on the thought-
fulness of the-judiciary, but, rather, to construct a conceptual frame-
work that would render coherent the central ideal of the profession-
decision according to law. I was trying to explain how law is possible.
At the highest levels of the judicial process-as we get closest to
the ideal--debate, discussion, and deliberation about the professional
norms (the disciplining rules) are in fact commonplace and are under-
stood to be central to the decisional process. Moreover, even when
judges operate short of the ideal and move to judgment almost by in-
stinct, the norms that I speak of have a role similar to that of rules of
grammar. They are objects of self-conscious reflection. Judges who in
fact decided by instinct can wonder whether they did the right thing
and can measure their performance against the norms of their profes-
sion. Even before decision, judges can check their initial inclinations
and wonder whether they are in accord with those norms.
Fish often speaks of "tacit knowledge,"43 and it may seem to some
that the issue that divides us is one of human psychology: The theory
would be that I see the norms "outside" the judge, while Fish believes
they are "inside." But that's not it. I concede that norms might be
internalized, and in any event, Fish is not trying to locate norms within
the human psyche. He is trying to get away from norms altogether. In
order to make his point-that judges do not enjoy the freedom that
Levinson postulated and that I try to curb through my disciplining
rules-Fish must argue for a form of knowledge of a very special kind.
Not only must it be internal, as the term "tacit knowledge" suggests,
but even more importantly, it must propel action or govern decision
almost instinctively. It cannot be in need of interpretation, for Fish has
argued that anything that needs interpretation cannot constrain. The
43. Id.
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kind of knowledge Fish seeks cannot be the object of analysis, discus-
sion, or reflection.
Fish appears to broaden his account of "tacit knowledge" when he
speaks of certain "understandings" of the judge, for example, the
judge's "sense" or "view" of "what the Constitution is for."" Fish sug-
gests that these "understandings" are an important, even decisive,
source of decision. This addendum appears to render his account of
judging more plausible, but it does so only on the assumption that these
"understandings" are viewed as "internalized disciplining rules" or
other forms of knowledge that he earlier denounced. This is strongly
suggested by Fish's examples of these "understandings," for they sound
like our old disciplining rules, though even more abstract and general
than I ever imagined. One "understanding" depicts the Constitution as
"an instrument for enforcing the intentions of the framers"; another
claims the Constitution is "a device for assuring the openness of the
political process"; and a third says that the Constitution is "a blueprint
for the exfoliation of a continually evolving set of fundamental val-
ues."45  Clearly any of these "understandings" must be interpreted;
they are texts, just as much as my disciplining rules or any norms are.
Thus under Fish's own argument (texts cannot constrain because they
are in need of interpretation), these understandings cannot do the work
he assigns them-to provide a basis of decision which denies the possi-
bility of freedom and thus make unnecessary the constraint to be sup-
plied by disciplining rules. In order to do that, these "understandings"
must be reduced by Fish to an instinctive form of knowledge, another
form of "know how," a non-text.
In a final turn of the argument, introduced as a parenthetical
aside, Fish says, "When I use phrases like 'without reflection' and 'im-
mediately and obviously' I do not mean to preclude self-conscious de-
liberation on the part of situated agents."" This sounds odd to my ear,
a distortion of ordinary language and, indeed, of the entire thrust of
Fish's argument. Most anyone would assume that "without reflection"
means "without self-conscious deliberation," and I am thus left to won-
der what Fish in fact means. Alas, Fish continues: "[I]t is just that
such deliberations always occur within ways of thinking that are them-
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Thus far, Fish has situated the judge within a practice; soon he will
situate texts within a practice; but now he is trying to situate "delibera-
tions" within a practice of its own, and that turns out to be "ways of
thinking." "Deliberation" is for me a "way of thinking," and conse-
quently, I do not understand what it would be for "deliberations" to be
"situated" within "ways of thinking" (and even less what it would be
for "ways of thinking" to be a "ground" of "consciousness"). But
these puzzlements need not be resolved, for this nesting of cognitive
processes won't advance Fish's case. Even if "deliberations" were
somehow "situated" within "ways of thinking," it would not follow
that the deliberations are not real or important, or that the judge knows
immediately and without reflection what to do, or that the judge's de-
liberations are so constrained as to render the disciplining rules
superfluous.
In the end, I find that this parenthetical aside, like the talk about
"understandings," leads nowhere. The exaltation of "tacit knowledge"
reduces to judgment by instinct. Fish's purpose has been to explain
why disciplining rules are unnecessary, and he has searched for a way
to deny the freedom that Levinson proclaimed and that I offered my
disciplining rules to combat. But he has achieved his purpose by trival-
izing the self-conscious and reflective moments of decision (when the
judge thinks about the norms of the profession and their implications
for the case at hand). These moments may not be as deep and as full as
we would like, especially in this age of mass justice, but they are at the
core of our professional ideals and probably explain the special appeal
of adjudication as a distinctive form of institutionalized power.
2. The Contextualization of the Text
In his account of the judge, Fish reflects the conventionalist em-
phasis on practice (but takes it to false extremes): The judge is "always
and already" situated in a practice (the profession). Fish also gives an
account of the text which might be seen as another facet of convention-
alism: The Constitution is also situated. Fish argues that all texts are
part of a context and "never appear in any but an already contextual-
ized form."4
In situating a judge within a practice, Fish hoped to show that the
freedom I worried about does not exist and that there is therefore no
need for disciplining rules because the judge is already constrained. By
48. Id
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situating the text within a context, Fish once again tries to allay my
fears, but now he wants to show that the problem of the Constitution
that I worried over-namely that it is a text with many meanings-is
without basis. I have assumed that the Constitution embodies a public
morality, that this morality is capable of many meanings (when applied
to a specific situation like segregated schools, and when account is
taken of the whole Constitution), and that the task of judging is one of
choice. (The disciplining rules are supposed to be the standards to gov-
ern that choice.) To this Fish responds: "[T]here are. . . no texts that
have a plurality of meanings, so that there is never the necessity of
having to choose between them. 4 9
Fish's assertion seems to contradict the most elemental under-
standing of the Constitution (or for that matter any other legal or liter-
ary text that I can think of). If it were merely a proposition that might
be tested by our ordinary experience or our ordinary understanding of
language, it could be rejected out of hand. But Fish is not proceeding
in such an ordinary manner, as becomes quite evident a moment later,
when he couples his assertion that there are no texts that have "many
meanings" with an assertion that there are "no texts that have a single
meaning."5 How can it be that there are no texts with a single mean-
ing and no texts with many meanings? Fish answers this question by
explaining that meaning is not a "property" or quality or attribute of a
text, but, rather, of the context in which the text is located.-' The Con-
stitution for Fish is not the "repository" of a public morality or of any
meaning whatsoever.5 2 When we speak of a text such as the Constitu-
tion and say that it has many meanings, we are, according to Fish, re-
ally talking about a situation in which people disagree about the
meaning of the text (because they are reading it with different interpre-
tive assumptions, etc.). When we speak of a text with a single meaning,
we are talking about a situation of agreement.
I do not believe that this view (which makes the meaning of a text
the property of a context rather than a text) in any way follows from
the conventionalist tenet-which I believe to be true-that every text is
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interpreted object."53 Fish simply seems to be taking conventionalism
to illogical extremes and confounding a situation (context) with an ob-
ject located in that situation (the text), or confusing the act of interpre-
tation with the object of interpretation. Moreover, I fail to see what
there is to be gained from his strategy of making meaning a property of
a context rather than of a text. The theoretical problem we confront,
you will recall, is one of constraint: The question is whether there is a
need for a concept such as disciplining rules. Fish sought to deny that
there is any such need by proclaiming that there are no texts with many
meanings, but all he has done is recharacterize the problem of choice
and thus the need for constraint. Choices still must be made, though
now it is not a choice among several "meanings of a text" (for texts
have no meanings), but rather among "different interpretive assump-
tions" (for example, about the purpose of the text, etc.). The Constitu-
tion is, I admit, an "always and already interpreted object," but that
does not deny the need to interpret it, to reinterpret it, or to choose
among conflicting interpretations.
At one point in his essay, Fish concedes that even though the Con-
stitution is "always an already interpreted object," conflicts will arise
and choices will have to be made. He then puts to himself the question
of method: "How are these conflicts to be settled?"5 4 My answer to
this question makes reference to the disciplining rules, the authoritative
norms of the interpretive community, but Fish is adamant in his deter-
mination not to introduce into his account any such norms or standards
and, as a result, blurs whatever distinctions might flow from such
norms. "How are these conflicts to be settled?," he asks himself and
then continues:
The answer to this question is that they are always in the process of
being settled, and that no transcendent or algorithmic method of in-
terpretation is required to settle them. The means of settling them
are political, social, and institutional, in a mix that is itself subject to
modification and change.55
Is this an adequate answer?
Adjudication may be subject to two different attacks. One is based
on a moral vision that condemns the institutionalized relationships that
are necessarily entailed in adjudication and that begins to point to new
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prominent - intellectual and political movement of the day, Critical
Legal Studies, often aspires to a critique so radical, but it fails in its
delivery because it does not explain how we could meet the genuine
needs presently served by adjudication and. yet avoid the excesses of
that institution. There is, however, another, somewhat lesser critique of
adjudication also mounted by the Critical Legal Studies movement:
This critique claims not so much that adjudication is evil, but that it is
incoherent. The theory is that the judge lacks any distinctive legal
standards to guide or constrain his or her judgment, and that the judge,
by choice and of necessity, draws upon values, viewpoints, etc., that are
either personal or rooted in the various social groups to which he or she
belongs. This theory is similar to that espoused by Levinson and is
encapsulated in the movement's slogan, "law is politics."
Stanley Fish is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a member of
the Critical Legal Studies movement. He believes in professionalism,
as do most conventionalists. He does not seek to undermine adjudica-
tion: He does not claim that it is evil nor even that it is incoherent.
Indeed, he probably thinks it is more coherent than I do. The problem,
however, is that he offers an account of that institution and answers the
question of method in a way that blurs the line between law and poli-
tics. His point is not so much to dispute the existence of legal norms or
standards, but to deny a role for any norms or standards. All is prac-
tice. But once you enter Fish's normless world, you have lost the ba-
sis-other than instinct or "know-how"-for separating good
judgments from bad ones, or legal judgments from political ones. All
you can say is that there are conflicting interpretations and that "[tlhe
means of settling [them] are political, social, and institutional, in a mix
that is itself subject to modification and change" 56 -which, in my judg-
ment, is not saying much at all.
Under my account, professional norms constrain judges in choos-
ing among the conflicting interpretations and are the standards for as-
sessing the correctness of their decisions. My reference to disciplining
rules allows me to see an inner coherence to the law, and to speak
about the legal correctness of a decision such as Brown. I also envision
a role for an external critic of a decision, who stands outside of the law
and operates on some other standards, such as those rooted in moral or
political principles. Fish insists that this distinction between the inter-
nal and external critic is "less firm and less stable" than I suggest.57 He
56. Id
57. Id.
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also belittles the distinction I draw between the various strategies open
to a critic of a judicial decision-amending the Constitution as opposed
to "packing" the Court or enacting statutes that curtail jurisdiction:
"In calling these latter strategies 'lesser' and 'more problematic,' Fiss
once again assumes a distinction that cannot finally be maintained.
Presumably," Fish continues, "they are 'lesser' and 'more problematic'
because they are obviously political; but in fact the entire system is
political and the question at any moment is from which point in the
system is pressure being applied to what other points.""8
Too often in the law we transform differences in degree into differ-
ences in kind; lawyers tend to see lines where there are only gradations
of gray (so my students and friends often remind me). Fish's brand of
conventionalism may be a healthy corrective for this tendency, but I
cannot help believing that in the end it is a bit too much, and that Fish
is destroying distinctions that comport with the way we think and talk
about the law and that have served us well. For those in the profession,
and maybe even for those outside, it seems terribly important-not just
as a psychological matter, but also for purposes of figuring out what
you can and cannot do-to know the difference between a "legal" ar-
gument, and a "political" one, that is, to know that passing a constitu-
tional amendment is a more "legitimate" response to a detested
decision than is "packing" the Court. Of course, all of these distinc-
tions are made in terms of an ongoing "system,"-a certain discourse
and set of institutions that we know all too well-and it might be that
the "entire system," viewed from some transcendental perspective, is
"political." But that seems to be beside the point. We work and live
within this world, not at some point of transcendence (as any conven-
tionalist should know). Adjudication is an ongoing institution (or prac-
tice) and the purpose of this exercise to identify those features that
distinguish it from other institutions and that call forth and justify the
special normative discourse that surrounds it.
Let me also note, on perhaps a more technical level, that Fish's
assault on the distinction between law and politics does not in any way
flow from his views about the contextualized nature of texts or any of
the other insights of conventionalism. It simply flows from his unwill-
ingness to allow any place in his system for disciplining rules or any
other form of generalized norms. I see them as essential because, for
me, adjudication is a process that calls upon judges to choose among
conflicting interpretations (or "meanings," or "interpretive assump-
58. Id
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tions," or whatever) of some authoritative text and because the law as-
sumes that these choices are made pursuant to standards. The
distinction between law and politics arises from the fact that the stan-
dards for judges are not necessarily the same as those for political ac-
tors or moral prophets. The distinction assumes different standards for
different actors.
In my earlier article, I tried to identify the forces that tend to make
legal and political standards converge-the desire of the judge to avoid
crises, the sharing of similar normative concepts such as "equality,"
etc. 9 I acknowledged the considerable convergence of law and politics
that has in fact occured in American society and indicated that this
convergence might be one of the most distinctive features of our legal
system. But I did not suggest that the convergence was complete, and
more to the point, I do not believe that this convergence is in any way
attributable to the fact that texts-whether they be the Constitution it-
self or disciplining rules-are always contextualized or that judges are
situated within a practice. Wittgenstein tried to give an account of
meaning that employed the idea of a language game, but always in-
sisted upon the multiplicity of language games.60
III. THE STAKES
In the final paragraph of his paper, Fish announces "that nothing
hangs on Fiss's account, or, for that matter, on my account either. '"6 1
With this assertion Fish (once again) reveals his love for the paradoxi-
cal, but also, and more significantly, reflects the conventionalist empha-
sis on practice and context. As Wittgenstein put it, "[D]on't think, but
look."6 2 As a conventionalist, Fish believes that everything is in place:
The judge is situated; the text is situated; so what possible significance
could there be to a theoretical dispute about adjudication?
This may be a real problem for Fish (I doubt it), but not for me. I
do not believe that everything is in place. It is important to look, but I
also believe that it is important to think, and that there is a crucial
place in the profession of law for the theoretical. Professional training
does try to instill "know how," but that is not all there is to the law (nor
perhaps even to basketball). Ideas do matter. Indeed, the interest the
profession has shown in Fish's own theoretical work suggests that not
59. Fiss, supra note 3, at 753-54.
60. L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, §§ 23-24, at I Ie-12e.
61. Fish, supra note 3.
62. L. WITMrENSTEIN, supra note I, § 66, at 31e.
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all is practice (although Fish assures me that this interest is a passing
fad that will last for only seven years). I mention this now not in order
to find another ground for impeaching Fish's account, but only to ex-
plain why I believe it is important to figure out whether Fish is right
(and I wrong).
Theory informs practice, just as surely as practice informs theory,
and in my view Fish's theory threatens two important practices of the
profession. One is the value placed on self-conscious reflection-those
moments when a judge considers the interpretive choices and identifies
and weighs the norms of the profession that are to guide that choice.
Fish denies that such moments exist ("a judge always knows in general
what to do"63), and in that denial both legitimates and invites a certain
thoughtlessness. Those who judge by instinct are told not to worry,
because that is what they must of necessity do. The others-the great
judges-only believe that they are deliberating.
Fish's account also jeopardizes the special pull that the norms of
the profession have-and should have-upon the judge. Anything
goes. The judge is told by Fish that "the entire system is political" and
all that differs is the "point in the system" where the pressure is ap-
plied. These words might be taken seriously by some judges (although
I have explained why they shouldn't), and if so, they might generate a
set of practices that would turn law into politics. Judges who listen to
Fish would see no reason for being especially faithful to the norms of
the profession and would instead believe they are entitled to do
whatever they think best. The discipline that is so prized by the law
would be gone, and with it much of the law's special claim for our
respect.
63. Fish, supra note 3. One can only wonder what he means by "in general."
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